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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THE 1982-1983 TERM
Part II
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
This is the second of a two-part article reviewing the
significant decisions involving criminal procedure decided by the Supreme Court last Term. Part I appeared in
the last issue.
Z;

FIFTH AMENDMENT
Refusal to Submit to Intoxication Test
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
the Court held that a compelled blood-alcohol test
did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Although the
Court recognized that such a procedure involved
"complusion" and "incriminating evidence," it
concluded that the Fifth Amendment was intended
to prohibit only the compelled production of testimonial or communicative evidence, not real or
physical evidence. Last Term, in South Dakota v.
Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), the Court addressed
an issue left unresolved in Schmerber: whether evi·
dence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a
blood-alcohol test violated the Fifth Amendment.
The South Dakota Supreme Court had held that
such a refusal was "a tacit or overt expression and
communication of defendant's thoughts" and thus
covered by the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not, however,
hold that the defendant's refusal to take the test
was not communicative or testimonial. Instead, the
Court ruled that the request to take the test did
not constitute complusion within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. The Court reasoned that
since the state could compel the defendant to take
the test under Schmerber, the offering of an option
to refuse the test and attaching penalties to the
exercise of that option (i.e., admission of the evidence at trail), was valid. /d. at 923. In a footnote,
the Court also pointed out that "a police inquiry of
whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test
is not an interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda." /d. at 923 n.15.

Comment on Silence
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the
Supreme Court ruled that prosecutorial comment
on a defendant's failure to testify placed an unconstitutional burden on the Fifth Amendement
guarantee against self-incrimination. In U.S. v.
Hastings, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983), the Seventh Circuit had refused to apply the harmless error rule to
a Griffin violation. The Supreme Court construed
the Seventh Circuit disposition of the case as an
exercise of that court's supervisory powers to discipline prosecutors.
In an opinion written by the Chief Justice, the
Court reviewed the policies underlying the supervisory powers, under which federal courts may formulate procedural rules not specifically required
by the Constitution or the Congress. These powers
are used (1) to implement a remedy for violation of
recognized rights, (2) to preserve judicial integrity
by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate
considertions validly before the jury, and (3) as a
remedy designed to deter illegal conduct. /d. at
1978-79. According to the Court, the first two policies are not implicated where an error is harmless.
"Supervisory power ... is not needed as a remedy
when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since by definition, the conviction would have
been obtained notwithstanding the asserted error."
/d. at 1979. In addition, the integrity of the process
rationale "carries less weight" because under the
harmless error doctrine the judgment stands only
if there is no reasonable doubt that the error contributed to the conviction.
Finally, the deterrence rationale is not applicable where the prosecutorial comment "is at most
an attenuated violation of Griffin and where means
more narrowly tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available." /d. In a footnote,
the Court pointed out that the lower court could
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have ordered the prosecutor to show cause why he
should not be disciplined, or requested the Justice
Department to initiate disciplinary proceedings, or
chastised the prosecutor publicly in the opinion.
ld. at 1979 n.5. The Court went on to conclude that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The records of the Illinois proceedings were
somewhat unclear, indicating that Lonberger had
been informed at the time of his plea that he was
being charged with "an attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife." No mention of attempted murder appeared. Lonberger, however, had been arraigned on the attempted murder charge and was
represented by counsel at the time of his plea. The
Ohio courts found that Lonberger understood that
he was pleading guilty to attempted murder. The
federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides for a presumption of correctioness .for state
court factual findings. See Sumner v. Mata, 449
U.S. 539 (1982). One of the exceptions to this presumption involves cases where a federal habeas
court concludes that the factual determinations
are not "fairly supported" by the record.

Immunity
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983}, involved a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
6002. Conboy was granted use immunity when he
appeared before a federal grand jury investigating
price-fixing under the antitrust laws. In subsequent
civil litigation, a federal district court ordered that
his immunized testimony be made available to the
civil litigants. Thereafter Conboy was deposed, at
which time he was examined on his immunized
testimony. When asked whether this testimony
was true, he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. In an opinion written by Justice
Powell, the Court held that Conboy had properly invoked the Fifth Amendment.
The Court offered two reasons for its decision.
First, the federal immunity statute provides for only use and derivative use immunity, not transactional immunity. If the civil deposition testimony
were held to derive from his immunized grand jury
testimony, more testimony would be immunized
than the government had originally intended. Moreover, such a ruling would make it more difficult for
the government to establish in a subsequent prosecution of Conboy that its evidence was not derived from the deposition testimony. This result, in
effect, would invest the deponent with transactional immunity, a result not intended by Congress in
enacting the federal immunity statute.
Second, the deponent would be subjected to
substantial risks in the event a court in a subsequent prosecution held that his deposition testimony was not immunized. The Court wrote: "Unless the grant of immunity assures a witness that
his incriminating testimony will not be used
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution,
the witness has not received the certain protection
of his Fifth Amendment privilege that he has been
forced to exchange." ld. at 616.

According to a majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, "This deference requires
that a federal habeas court more than simply disagree with the state court before rejecting its factual determinations. Instead, it must conclude that
the state court's findings lacked even 'fair[] support' in the record." 103 S. Ct. at 850. In addition,
the Sixith Circuit apparently credited Lonberger's
habeas testimony that he believed he pled guilty
only to aggravated battery, not attempted murder.
The Court disagreed with this assessment: "28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses
whose demeanor has been observed by the state
trial court, but not by them." ld. at 851. Thus, the
Court concluded that the factual findings were
supported by the record.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, disagreeing with the majority's resolution of the habeas issue. Of greater significance was Justice Stevens' dissent, which was joined by three other Jus·
tices. He questioned the continued validity of
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), which upheld
the admission at trail of a prior conviction for the
purpose of punishment. He argued that Ohio's refusal to use a bifurcated procedure in which the
prior conviction could be admitted only after conviction was unconstitutional, especially in a case
in which the defense offered to stipulate to the pri·
or conviction. "[T]he tactics employed in this case
dramatically unmask the true prosecutorial interest
in preserving a one-stage procedure - to enhance
the likelihood that the jury will convict." /d. at 863.
The majority rejected this argument in a footnote.
ld. at 853 n.6.
Maggio v. Fulford, 103 S. Ct. 2261 (1983), also involved federal habeas review of state court factual
findings. At trial the defendant raised the issue of
his mental competency to stand trial. The trial
judge ruled that he was competent, a decision that
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal
in habeas proceedings, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.
The Supreme Court reversed per curiam. Citing
Sumner v. Mata, the majority stated that "the
Court of Appeals erroneously substituted its own
judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that

HABEAS CORPUS
State Court Factual Findings
Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S.Ct. 843 (1983}, involved an Ohio conviction for aggravated murder
with specifications, i.e., that the defendant had
previously been convicted for a "purposeful killing
of or attempt to kill another." RC 2929.04(A)(5).
Lonberger argued that his prior Illinois conviction
for attempted murder was unconstitutional because his guilty plea had not been voluntarily and
intelligently made as required by Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), and Boykin v. Ala·
bama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). If the plea was unconstitutional, the conviction could not be used in the
Ohio trial according to Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109 (1967).
2

ing capital punishment in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.
Ct. 2733 (1983). Stephens was convicted of murder
~nd in the penalty phase of the trial the jury explicItly found that three of the aggravating circumstances, which trigger capital punishment under the
Georgia statute, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury imposed the death sentence.
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held, based
o~ an earlier decision, that one of the aggravating
Circumstances - a substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions - was unconstitutionally vague. Nevertheless, the state court
upheld the imposition of the death penalty. The
defendant challenged this ruling.
After reviewing the state capital punishment
scheme and finding no constitutional objections to
it, the Court turned its attention to the argument
that the invalidity of one o. the statutory aggravating circumstances underlying the jury's sentencing verdict invalidated the death sentence. The
defendant's argument rested on his interpretation
of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
According to the Court, Stromberg establishes
two related but different rules. First, Stromberg
"requires that a general verdict must be set aside
if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any
of two or more independent grounds, and one of
those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict
may have rested exclusively on the insufficient
ground." !d. at 2745. Stephens did not come within
this rule because he jury did not return a general
verdict, but rather made specific findings that each
aggravating circumstance had been proven. Sec·
ond, Stromberg encompasses a situation in which
a general verdict on a single-count indictment
rested on both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground. Because such cases involve First
Amendment rights, the Court found them inapplic·
able to Stephens' case.
Finally, the Court held that evidence of the
Stephan's past criminal record, which had been
admitted to establish the invalid aggravating cir·
cumstance, would have been admissible in any
event during the penalty phase and thus did not
impermissively prejudice him.
The Court also addressed the use of aggravating
factors in Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
The Florida capital sentencing scheme requires a
jury determination on the merits, a jury recommendation on the death penalty, and a trial judge sentencing decision. In imposing the death penalty,
the trial court is required to make three findings:
(1) that at least one statutory aggravating factor is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) that the
statutory aggravating circumstances are not
outweighed by statutory mitigating circumstances
and (3) tha,t death is an appropriate sentence for '
the individual defendant.
The principal issue in Barclay involved the trial
court's consideration of a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance - the defendant's prior record
- in imposing the death sentence. Under Florida
law, nonstatutory aggravating circumstances may

of the Lousiana courts - a prerogative which 28
U.S.C. § 2254 does not allow it." /d. at 2262.
Exhaustion of State Remedies
The present Court's inclination to restrict federal
habeas relief, was also evidenced in Anderson v.
Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276 (1982). Harless was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, he claimed a
jury instruction on "malice" had been "erroneous"
and cited several state cases in support. After his
appeal was rejected, he filed a habeas petition.
The federal district court held the instruction unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510 (1979), because it shifted the burden of
proof on the issue of malice to the defendant. The
court also found that Harless had exhausted his
state remedies as required by the habeas statute.
The Sixth Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court did
not.
In a per curiam opinion, from which Justices
Stevens, Brennan and Marshall dissented the
Court held that Harless had failed to exh~ust his
state remedies. The Court wrote: "It is not enough
that all the facts necessary to support the federal
claim were before the state courts ... or that a
somewhat similar state-law claim was made ... the
habeas petitioner must have 'fairly presented' to
the state courts the 'substance' of his federal ha·
beas corpus claim." /d. at 277. By merely claiming
that the instruction was erroneous and citing state
cases, Harless had failed to satisfy this requirement, and thus had not exhausted his state remedies.
Stone v. Powell
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court placed substantial limitations on federal habeas review of alleged Fourth Amendment
violations. Under Stone, such review is precluded
where the prisoner has had an opportunity for a
full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment
claim in the state courts. In Cardwell v. Taylor, 103
S. Ct. 2015 (1983), the Court reaffirmed Stone.
Taylor i~itially challenged the admissibility of his
confe~s1?n on the gro_und that it was not voluntary.
The d1stnct court denied relief. On appeal the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the statement may have
been obtained in violation of Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1975), in which the Supreme
Court had held that statements obtained while a
defendant was illegally detained at a stationhouse
were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
Dunaway, however, was decided on Fourth Amend·
ment, not Fifth Amendment, grounds. The Supreme
Court held in Taylor that Stone controlled and
therefore consideration of this issue was precluded. "Only if the statements are involuntary, and
therefore obtained in violation of the Fifth Amend·
ment could the federal courts grant relief on collateral review." /d. at 2016.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Aggravating Circumstances
The Court returned to constitutionality of impos3

issued by the district or appellate court, the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to address
the merits of the appeal. "Accordingly, a circuit
court, where necessary to prevent the case from
becoming moot by the petitioner's execution,
should grant a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal when a condemned prisoner obtains a certificate of probable cause on his initial
habeas appeal." /d. at 3394.

not be considered. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
plurality, held that consideration of a nonstatutory
aggravating circumstance, even if contrary to state
law, did not violate the U.S. Constitution. He noted
that the imposition of the death penalty based
solely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
would be a different matter. In Barclay, however,
statutory aggravating circumstances had been
found. Justice Stevens, along with Justice Powell,
concurred on this issue; Justice Brennan and Marshall dissented.

Third, appellate courts may adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits of habeas appeals,
notwithstanding the issuance of a certificate of
probable cause, provided counsel has adequate
opportunity to address the merits. "If appropriate
notice is provided, argument on the merits may be
heard at the same time the motion .for a stay is
considered .... " /d. at 3395. Fourth, successive
habeas petitions may be dismissed if no new or
different grounds for relief are alleged. Even if dismissal is not appropriate, district courts may expedite consideration of a petition. "The granting of a
stay should reflect the presence of substantial
grounds upon which relief might be granted." /d.
Fifth, stays of execution are not automatic pending the filing and consideration of a petition for a
writ of certiorari from the Court.

Expedited Appeals; Future Prediction of
Dangerousness
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983), presented the Court with two different issues. The
first involved the procedures used by federal
courts in reviewing habeas petitions in capital
cases. The second issue involved the constitutionality of using expert predictions of future dangerousness in imposing the death penalty.
Barefoot was convicted of the murder of a police
officer. In the sentencing phase, the jury was instructed, as provided by a Texas statute, to determine whether "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society."
The jury answered in the affirmative, and the defendant was sentenced to death. After the defendant exhausted his state appellate and habeas
remedies, he filed a federal habeas petition. When
the federal district court rejected the petition, the
defendant filed a motion with the Fifth Circuit requesting a stay of execution pending an appeal
from the denial of the petition. The Fifth Circuit
considered the merits of the appeal at the same
time it considered the stay of execution.
In addressing the procedural issue, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice White, commented: "Approving the execution of a defendant before his appeal is decided on the merits would
clearly be improper .... However, a practice of deciding the merits of an appeal, when possible, together with the application for a stay, is not inconsistent with our cases." !d. at 3392. The Fifth Circuit followed the latter procedure in Barefoot and
the Court found no error in this practice, provided
the defendant is given an adequate opportunity to
address the merits of the appeal. The Court wrote:
"The parties addressed the merits and were given
unlimited time to present argument .... The primary issue presented had been briefed and argued
throughout the proceedings in the state courts and
rebriefed and reargued in the District Court's
habeas corpus proceeding." !d. at 3392-93.
The Court went on to provide guidelines for
stays of execution and habeas appeals. First, a petitioner is required by statute to obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal. This requirement
is intended to separate meritorious from frivolous
appeals. According to the Court, a certificate of
probable cause requires the petitioner to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a federal
right. Second, if a certificate of probable cause is

The issue on the merits involved the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony concerning the
defendant's future dangerousness. Two experts
testified about future dangerousness in response
to hypothetical questions. Neither had personally
examined the defendant. Reaffirming Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court held that future
dangerousness was a valid consideration in death
penalty cases. Consequently, expert testimony on
dangerousness was admissible. Although the
Court recognized that there is a dispute about
whether such expert predictions are valid, the
Court observed: "We are unconvinced, however, at
least as of now, that the adversary process cannot
be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has the
opportunity to present his own side of the case."
/d. at 3398. Moveover, the use of hypothetical
questions and the lack of a personal examination
of the defendant by the experts were not unconstitutional.
Justice Marshall, along with Justice Brennan,
dissented. He focused on the Court's sanctioning
of expedited procedures in capital cases: "If full
briefing and argument are generally regarded as
necessary to fair and careful review of a nonfrivolous appeal - and they are - there is absolutely
no justification for providing fewer procedural protections solely because a man's life is at stake."
/d. at 3404. Justice Blackmun also dissented. He
focused on the merits. Relying on research concerning predictions of future dangerousness, he
criticized the Court for permitting expert predictive
testimony "despite the fact that such testimony is
wrong two times out of three." /d. at 3406.
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Commutation Instruction
California law requires the trial court in a capital
sentencing proceeding to instruct the jury that the
Governor has the power to grant a reprieve, pardon
or commute a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The instruction was
given in Ramos v. California, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983),
and the jury imposed death. The California Supreme Court reversed, finding the instruction violative of federal constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor,
disagreed. According to the Court, the "instruction
does not violate any of the substantive limitations
this Court's precedents have imposed on the capital sentencing process. It does not preclude individualized sentencing determinations or consideration of mitigating factors, nor does it impermissively inject an element too speculative for the
jury's deliberation. Finally, its failure to inform the
jury also of the Governor's power to commute a
death sentence does not render it constitutionally
infirm." /d. at 3459.
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented.

~I

cited a case in which the defendant concedes the
issue of intent and presents an afirmative defense,
and a case in which the defendant is acquitted on
the erroneously instructed charge and convicted of
an unrelated offense. /d. at 977-78.
The precedential value of the opinion, however,
is undercut by Justice Stevens concurring opinion;
he cast the fifth vote affirming the judgment. Justice Stevens did not believe that the case presented a federal question and only concurred in order
to allow the lower court's judgment to stand. The
four dissenting Justices not only found the harmless error doctrine applicable to Sandstrom errors
but that a court reviewing the trial record could
"well say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
found the presumption unnecessary to its task of
determining intent." /d. at 985.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983), the
Court addressed the issue of multiple punishments
under the double jeopardy clause. Based on his
participation in a robbery of an A&P store in which
he had used a weapon, Hunter was convicted of
first degree robbery and armed criminal action. Under Missouri law, armed criminal action is defined
as the commission of any felony under the laws of
Missouri by, with, or through the use, assistance
or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon. /d. at 676.
Armed criminal action is a separate offense punished by a term of not less than three years. The
defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of
tens years for first degree robbery and fifteen
years for armed criminal action. On appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that armed criminal
action and the underlying felony were "the same
offense" for purposes of the double jeopardy
clause and therefore the imposition of punishment
for both offenses was prohibited.
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. According to the Court, "[w]ith respect to cumulative
sentences imposed in a single trial, the double
jeapordy clause does no more than prevent the
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." /d. at 678. In a
subsequent passage, the Court wrote that "simply
because two criminal statutes may be construed
to proscribe the same conduct ... does not mean
that the double jeapordy clause precludes the
imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes." /d. at 679.
Since the Missouri Supreme Court had found that
the legislature specifically intended to impose cumulative punishments, Hunter had suffered no
constitutional deprivation.

CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the
Court held an instruction informing the jury that
"the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of voluntary acts" violated the
due process clause. Sandstrom, however, left unresolved the question of whether such an instruction could be considered harmless error. The Court
addressed this issue in Connecticut v. Johnson,
103 S. Ct. 969 (1983).
Johnson was charged with attempted murder,
kidnapping, robbery, and sexual assault. The defense theory was that the defendant did not intend
to kill the victim or permanently keep her car. During the jury instructions, the trial court stated,
"However, you should be aware of a rule of law
that wi II be he Ipfu I to you and that is that a person's intention may be inferred from his conduct
and every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of
his act." /d. at 973. There was little question that
the instruction was erroneous under Sandstrom;
the issue was whether it was could be considered
harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386
u.s. 18 (1967).
Writing for a plurality, Justice Blackmun held
that only in rare situations could a Sandstrom violation be considered harmless error. According to
the plurality, an "erroneous presumption on a disputed element of the crime renders irrelevant the
evidence on the issue because the jury may have
relied upon the presumption rather than upon that
evidence .... The fact that the reviewing court
may view the evidence of intent as overwhelming
is then simply irrelevant." /d. at 977. As examples
of the "rare situations in which the reviewing court
can be confident that a Sandstrom error did not
Play any role in the jury verdict," Justice Blackmun

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Meaningful Relationship
In Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983), the defendant was convicted of robbery, burglary, false
imprisonment, rape, and forcible oral copulation. A
public defender, named Goldfine, was assigned to
represent him. Goldfine served as counsel at the
5
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Justice Blackmun, along with Justice Stevens, also concurred, finding "the Court's broad-ranging
dicta about the right to counsel ... unnecessary in
this case." /d. at 1625.

preliminary hearing and conducted an extensive investigation. After Goldfine was hospitalized for
emergency surgery, a second public defender, Hotchkiss, was assigned to the case. This occured six
days before trial. On the first day of trial, the defendant told the court that he had been represented by the new attorney for only several days.
Construing this statement as a request for a continuance, the trial court denied the motion. Hotchkiss stated that he was prepared to try the case
and Slappy stated that he was satisfied with his
attorney. On the second day the defendant again
raised the issue of his attorney's preparedness. On
the third day the defendant stated that Goldfine,
not Hotchkiss, was his attorney and thereafter
refused to cooperate with Hotchkiss.
Subsequently, Slappy filed a habeas petition.
The federal district court considered two issues:
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance (1) for Hotchkiss to prepare
and (2) to permit Goldfine to defend Slappy. Both
issues were decided against the defendant. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel would "be without substance if it did not include the right to a
meaningful attorney-client relationship." /d. at
1615.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by the Chief
Justice, reversed. The Court, relying on Hotchkiss'
representations that he was prepared to go to trial,
rejected the argument that a continuance should
have been granted. In addition, the Court questioned the defendant's motives in requesting Goldfine on the third day of trial, after he had stated he
was satisfied with Hotchkiss on the first day.
According to the Court, the request could be construed as "a transparent ploy for delay." /d. 1617.
On the most important aspect of the case, the
Chief Justice wrote:

On Appeal
Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), raised
the issue of whether an indigent defendant has a
constitutional right to compel his appointed attorney to argue nonfrivolous issues on appeal.
Barnes was convicted of robbery and assault. He
was assigned counsel for appeal and subsequently
sent a letter to this attorney outlining issues for
the appeal. The attorney accepted some of these
issues and rejected others. In his appellate brief,
he included three issues. He also submitted a pro
se brief written by the defendant. At oral argument,
the attorney pressed only the issues raised in his
brief. In subsequent habeas proceeding, the Second Circuit ruled that this was error. According to
that court, when a defendant requests that his attorney raise additional colorable points on appeal,
counsel must argue the additional points to the
full extent of his professional ability. On review, a
majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through
the Chief Justice, disagreed.
The defendant's argument rested upon his interpretation of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), in which the Court had held that appointed
counsel may not withdraw from a nonfrivolous appeal. In Barnes the majority distinguished Anders,
believing that Anders required an attorney to pursue nonfrivolous appeals but not all nonfrivolous
issues: "Neither Anders nor any other decision of
this Court suggests ... that the indigent defendant
has a constitutional right to compel appointed
counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by
the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional
judgment, decides not to present those points." /d.
at 3312.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the
grounds that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that the defendant, not the attorney,
have the determinative voice in deciding which
issues will be pursued on appeal. Justice Blackmun concurred.

The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel "would be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful
attorney-client relationship," ... is without basis in the
law. No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of
course none could be. No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney - privately retained or provided
by the public- that the Court of Appeals thought
part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.
Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a "meaningful relationship" between
an accused and his counsel. !d. at 1617.

PROBATION REVOCATION
The defendant in Beardon v. Georgia, 103 S. Ct.
2064 (1983), was placed on probation after being
convicted of burglary and receiving stolen proper
ty. As a condition of probation, he was required to
pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. He bar- .
rowed $200 to pay the first installment, but lost hiS
job prior to paying the remainder. Consequently,
his probation was revoked.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that
automatically revoking probation when a probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay a
fine or restitution and yet cannot do so through no
fault of his own violated the constitutional precept
of fundamental fairness. According to the Court,
under these circumstances the trial court "must
consider alternate measures of punishment other

Justice Brennan, along with Justice Marshall,
concurred in the result. He wrote, however, that
the case should have been decided against Slappy
because he had failed to make a timely request for
Goldfine. He rejected the majority's Sixth Amendment analysis: "But where an indigent defendant
wants to preserve a relationship he has developed
with counsel already appointed by the court, I can
perceive no rational or fair basis for failing at least
to consider this interest in determining whether
continued representation is possible." /d. at 1622.
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than imprisonment." /d. at 2073. As examples of alternative measures, the Court cited an extension
of the time for making payments, reduction of the
fine, or the performance of some form of labor or
public service in lieu of the fine. By failing to consider these alternatives, the trial court automatically turned a fine into a prison sentence.
The Court distinquished Bearden's situation
from other circumstances. First, "if the probationer
has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution
when he has the means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection." /d. at 2070. Second, "a
probationer's failure to make sufficient bona fide
efforts to seek employment or borrow money in
order to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an
insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to
society for his crime." /d. Accordingly, revocation
of probation would be justified.

treated more harshly than he would have been in
any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception
of a single State." /d.
The Chief Justice, along with Justices White,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, dissented, arguing that
the Court had ignored the precedent established in
Rummel v. Estelle.
INSANITY ACQUITEE
The defendant in Jones v. U.S., 103 S. Ct. 3043
(1983), was charged with attempting to steal a
jacket, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum
term of one year. Jones entered a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity, an affirmative defense established by a preponderance of the evidence. The
trial court accepted the plea, and Jones was committed to a mental hospital. Under the D.C. statute,
Jones was subject to release if he established by
a preponderance of evidence that he was entitled
to release. After being hospitalized for more than a
year, the maximum period he could have served in
prison if he had been convicted, Jones petitioned
the court to either release him unconditionally or
initiate civil commitment proceedings. Jones' argument was based on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979), in which the Court held that due process requires the Government in a civil commitment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill
and dangerous. The Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Powell, rejected Jones' arguments.
His initial point was that an insanity verdict
does not establish present mental illness or dangerousness. According to the Court, such a verdict
establishes two facts: (1) that the defendant committed the criminal act, and (2) that he committed
it because of mental illness. The finding that he
committed a criminal act indicates that he is dangerous. Moreover, "[i]t comports with common
sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." 103 S. Ct. 3050.
Jones next argued that his indefinite commitment was unconstitutional because proof of insanity was based on a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than Addington's civil commitment standard
of clear and convincing evidence. Again the Court
disagreed. The Addington standard rested on a
concern that a person could be confined civilly on
the basis of "some abnormal behavior which might
be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental
or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a
range of conduct that is generally acceptable." /d.
at 3051. According to the court, this concern is not
present in the case of an insanity acquittee be·
cause only the acquittee can advance and establish the insanity defense, and proof that he committed a criminal act eliminates the risk that he is
being committed only for "idiosyncratic behavior."
Finally, Jones contended that due process was
violated because he had been committed for a
longer period than he could have been imprisoned

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In recent years the Court has not been receptive
to arguments that imposition of noncapital sentences violates the cruel and unusual punishment
clause because they are disproportionate to the offense. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980);
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 374 (1981). In Solem v.
Helm, 33 Grim. L. Rptr. 3220 (1983), the Court, in a
5-4 opinion, reversed this trend and overturned a
sentence based upon the proportionality principle.
Helm was convicted of uttering a "no account"
check for $100. Because he had been convicted of
six prior offenses, he was sentenced under a recidivist statute to life imprisonment without parole.
He subsequently challenged the sentence as
violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, rejected
the state's assertion that the proportionality principle did not apply to felony prison sentences: "[W]e
hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted." /d. at 3223. In
reviewing a sentence to determine if it is disproportionate, the Court specified three "objective
criteria:" (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions. /d. at
3223-24.

In applying these criteria, the Court pointed out
that the crime for which Helm was convicted involved neither violence nor the threat of violence;
nor did it involve a large amount. Moreover, his
prior felonies were for relatively minor nonviolent
offenses. In contrast, the sentence of life imprisonment without parole is only surpassed in severity
by capital punishment. Thus, "Helm has received
the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct." /d. at 3227. As to the other criteria,
the Court concluded that Helm "has been treated
more harshly than other criminals in the State who
have committed more serious crimes. He has been
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ment requires a judgment as to the present and future." /d. 3056. Moreover, the "[r]esearch is practically nonexistent on the relationship of non-violent criminal behavior, such as petitioner's attempt
to shoplift, to future dangerousness." /d. at 3057.
Justice Stevens also dissented, concluding that
the insanity verdict was sufficient to justify the initial commitment but that once the defendant has
served the maximum punishment authorized, the
Government must establish the need tor continued
commitment by clear and convincing evidence.

had he been convicted. The Court rejected this argument as well. Incarceration for a crime is
based on a different rationale than commitment
after an insanity acquittal. "There simply is no
necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery."
/d. at 3052.
Justice Brennan, in a opinion joined by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, dissented. He pointed out
that an insanity verdict "is backward-looking, focusing on one moment in the past, while commit-
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